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Developmental studies have revealed that preschool-aged children believe that an agent’s 
internal properties are more important than its external properties for determining its 
identity over time. The current study examined the developmental origins of this 
understanding using a manual-search individuation task with 13-month-old infants. 
Subjects observed semi-transparent objects that looked and behaved like animate agents 
placed into box that they could reach but not see into. Across trials infants observed objects 
with either the same- or different-colored insides placed into the box. We found that infants 
used internal property differences more than external property differences to determine how 
many agents were involved in the event. A second experiment confirmed that this effect 
was specific to the domain of animate entities. These results suggest that infants are biased 
to see an agent’s ‘insides’ as more important for determining its identity over time than its 
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The way we reason about other people is fundamentally biased towards properties 
that lie beneath the surface. When making basic decisions about who someone is and how 
they are likely to behave we often ignore salient surface properties in favor of more internal 
and unobservable features. For example, adults judge whether a person is the same 
individual over time based on psychological properties like memory (Blok, Newman & 
Rips, 2005; Rips, 2011), and represent that people from the same social group share similar 
beliefs even though they differ in their external appearance and behaviors (Hirschfeld, 
1996). This bias sometimes manifests itself as a biological attribution where an agent’s 
‘insides’ are seen as being a greater determinant of its identity than whatever surface 
properties it may exhibit (Medin & Ortony, 1989).  
Young children’s explicit judgments reveal an early understanding that ‘insides’ are 
more relevant than external properties when judging an agent’s identity over time. For 
example, 4-year-old children who observe salient changes to an animal’s external 
appearance insist that the animal’s categorical identity remains unchanged, such that a tiger 
without stripes is still a tiger (Keil, 1989). On the other hand, when preschool-aged children 
are told that the insides of an animal are removed or changed they infer that their 
categorical identity should change as well (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). The same pattern of 
results has been found when children evaluate the individual identity of an animal across 
transformations (Gutheil & Rosengren, 1996). For instance, children as young as 4 years of 
age know that an animal’s food and behavioral preferences (e.g. a dog likes chew bones) 
remain stable regardless of important surface transformations. Since children seem to apply 
these beliefs to living things and not to simple artifacts (Gelman & Wellman, 1991) some 
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researchers have proposed that this type of reasoning reveals biological essentialist beliefs 
in children (Ahn, Kalish, Gelman, Medin, Luhmann, Atram, Coley, & Shafto, 2001; 
Gelman, 2003; Hall, 1998; Meunier & Cordier, 2009). From this perspective, natural kind 
objects, but not artifacts, are represented as possessing an underlying reality which is 
causally responsible for the pattern of observable features (Gelman, 2004; Medin & Ortony, 
1989). As a consequence, non-visible properties such as an agent’s insides are regarded as 
more relevant and diagnostic of identity than any external properties.  
When over development does this bias towards internal features emerge? Some 
studies suggest that at least part of this understanding exists in infancy. By 8 months of age, 
infants expect that an object that looks and acts alive will possess some internal properties 
(Setoh, Wu, Baillargeon & Gelman, 2013). For example, infants who were shown objects 
displaying both self-propelled movement and agentive cues (e.g. being all covered with 
fur), looked longer when they were revealed to be hollow rather than full on their insides, 
suggesting that infants may represent internal features as a biological property that is 
unique to entities that look and behave like animals. This pattern of results is consistent 
with an early developing “innards” principle (Gelman, 1990), the belief that something 
inside the animal is causally responsible for self-propelled movement (internal energy) and 
agency (internal states). 
Beyond the general expectation that self-propelled agents have insides, infants have 
also been shown to make more specific inferences in the reverse direction—first observing 
an agent’s internal properties and then using those features to create novel categories or to 
infer various behavioral properties. For example, 14-month-old infants will treat novel 
animate objects as if they belong to the same category when they share similar insides, 
while inanimate objects are categorized based on their external appearance (Welder & 
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Graham, 2006). At the same age infants will also automatically associate an agent’s 
idiosyncratic movement to the color of an internal part rather than to a salient external 
feature and generalize this association to other animate objects with the same insides, 
despite their ‘outsides’ being perceptually distinct (Newman, Herrmann, Wynn & Keil 
(2008). Furthermore, infants only seem to prioritize internal features when the objects in 
such tasks exhibit self-propelled behavior; when objects were moved by external means 
infants did not show a bias toward internal features (Newman et al., 2008).  
Overall, the developmental research described above suggests that infants represent 
an agent’s internal properties as more relevant than its external features when forming new 
categories or generalizing properties across individuals. Additionally, some of this evidence 
suggests that the internal features may be represented as a biological property, presumably 
with causal potency (e.g., Setoh et al., 2013). However, these prior results leave open an 
important question regarding how internal properties relate to infants’ representations of 
agents—do infants represent an agent’s ‘insides’ as more strongly connected to its identity 
than its external properties? In previous tasks, infants may have associated an internal 
feature with a particular movement type without necessarily treating an agent’s insides as a 
powerful cue that determines whether they are the same agent over time. If infants 
represent insides as a biological property, then they may regard them as more diagnostic 
than external non-biological properties in an identity judgment. In this way insides would 
not be represented just as a distinctive property of animate entities, but also as an essential 
feature that helps distinguish both the individual and categorical identity of agents through 
changes over time. 
The question of how infants represent the identity of objects over time has been 
most commonly addressed in the developmental literature through so-called individuation 
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experiments. In the classic version of these experiments infants witness various objects 
move in and out of view from behind an opaque barrier. Afterwards, the screen is lifted to 
reveal the number or objects involved in the event and infants’ looking-time responses are 
recorded. Experimenters estimate the number of objects that were represented based upon 
observing how long infants look at displays containing either 1 or 2 objects (for example, 
Xu & Carey, 1996). Since infants might only see one object appear from the barrier at a 
time, experimenters can determine which features (color, shape, texture, etc.) infants use to 
represent the objects as separate individuals. A great many of these individuation 
experiments have demonstrated that infants are able to disregard superficial perceptual 
features and use abstract conceptual information to individuate objects (Kingo & 
Krojgaard, 2011; Xu & Carey, 1996; Xu, Carey, & Quint, 2004; Xu, Carey & Welch, 
1999). For example, 10-month-old infants represent two objects behind a screen when one 
object displays a self-propelled movement while the other one’s motion appears externally-
caused (Surian & Caldi, 2010). By contrast, infants fail to represent two objects behind the 
screen when two agents with different superficial features are presented. This pattern of 
results suggests that infants are able to use the abstract ontological distinction between 
“agent” and “inert object” to represent object identity.   
These prior individuation studies demonstrate that from very early on infants 
represent some non-obvious properties (e.g., internally-caused motion) as more important 
than visible and external properties when representing agent identity. However, to our 
knowledge no prior individuation experiment has addressed the issue of whether or not 
infants are capable of using non-obvious biological properties as cues of agent identity. To 
address this issue we run a manual-search version of the individuation task (Feigenson & 
Carey, 2003; Van de Walle, Carey & Prevor, 2000). In this paradigm infants observe one or 
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more objects being placed inside an opaque box, which they can reach but not see into. The 
number of individual objects the infant represents is then estimated by observing the 
duration of their subsequent reaches into the box (e.g., a representation of two objects 
inside the box will lead infants to engage in a longer search duration than a representation 
of one object). In order to test whether infants’ individuation judgments are sensitive to an 
agent’s ‘insides’, we manipulated whether the internal and external features of transparent 
objects matched over time. In order to test whether a sensitivity to internal properties was 
specific to agents, we manipulated whether the stimuli did or did not display agent-like 
cues (i.e., possessing eyes and exhibiting self-propelled movement; similar to those used in 
Newman, et al., 2008). Experiment 1 was designed to test two hypotheses: first, that infants 
will represent differences in an agent’s internal properties as highly diagnostic of a change 
to the agents’ identity even when external properties remain the same; and second, that 
infants will represent differences in an agent’s external properties as less diagnostic of a 
change to the agent’s identity when internal properties remain the same. Experiment 2 was 
designed to test the hypothesis that the connection between an individual’s ‘insides’ and its 














Participants. Sixteen 13-month-old infants participated in this experiment (mean 
age = 13 months and 12 days, SD = 8 days). Half of the infants were girls. All infants were 
recruited from the Amherst, Massachusetts area. An additional 6 infants were tested but 
were excluded because of fussiness (2), experimental error (1), and disinterest (3). 
Stimuli. Infants observed six transparent toys being hidden in a black foam-core 
box (see Figure 1). The box measured 25.5 cm wide x 32.5 cm deep x 15 cm high. Its front 
face had an 18.5 x 10 cm opening covered by green spandex material, with a horizontal slit. 
The back face of the box had a 21 x 11 cm opening covered by a black spandex material. 
All six toys were transparent plastic spheres (5 cm in diameter) that were covered on the 
very top and on the bottom with acrylic paint (see Figure 2). Inside each sphere there was a 
small cube made of foam painted with a color that is clearly visible from the outside. A 
total of 6 toys with different color combinations were used. Toys in the Same Insides 
Condition contained inner cubes of the same color whereas paint on the sphere’s surface 
was a different color. Toys in the Different Insides Condition contained inner cubes with 
contrasting paint colors whereas paint on the spheres’ surfaces were identical (see Figure 
2). All toys were stabilized by a metallic washer attached to the bottom, and had two 
googly eyes glued on the front surface. A small magnet was attached in the center of the 
washer so that the experimenter could move the toy from below the top surface panel from 
inside the box with another small magnet. From a front perspective, the total visible surface 





Figure 1. Box 
 
Figure 2. Example toys: Same Insides Condition 
 
Design. All subjects received two Trial Types 1-Object and 2-Objects trials. In the 
2-Objects trials, toys had either insides with the same color (‘Same Insides’) or insides with 
different colors (‘Different Insides’). Subjects received two blocks (Same Insides Condition 
and Different Insides Condition) of four trials each (two 1-Object and two 2-Objects trials). 
Within each comparison block, the number of objects was presented in two different orders; 
either 2-1-1-2 or 1-2-2-1. Both, Block Order, whether infants received either Same Inside 
or Different Insides first, and Trial Order, whether infants receive either 1-Object or 2-
Objects trial first, were counterbalance across participants.  
Procedure. Infant subjects were seated on their parent’s lap in front of a table. A 
camera recorded a side-view of the session. 
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Familiarization phase. The experiment began with two familiarization trials. First, 
the experimenter brought out a box and showed it to the infant. He reached into the box and 
encouraged infant to do the same. Next, the experimenter brought out a toy duck, and then 
he inserted the toy through the opening of the box. Infants were encouraged to reach in and 
retrieve the toy. This procedure was then repeated with a different toy. Once infants 
appeared to be comfortable reaching inside the box the experimenter moved on to the test 
phase. 
Test phase. 1-Object trials measured infants’ searching within the box after 
retrieving the one object they saw hidden (‘Box Empty’ trials). First, the experimenter 
brought out a transparent toy from the box, which was placed out of reach. The toy was 
then placed on top of the box where it immediately began moving in an animate fashion 
across the top surface for about 6 seconds. The object’s movement was surreptitiously 
controlled by the experimenter from inside the box using a magnet and the toys followed 
motion paths with sharp and sudden changes in speed and direction that are known to elicit 
strong impressions of intentional agents (Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000). After the toy had 
stopped moving the experimenter grabbed the toy and inserted it through the box’s front 
opening. The experimenter then slid the box forward so that it was within reaching distance 
of the infant and assumed a neutral expression looking down towards the ground. The 
infants were then allowed to reach into the box and retrieve the toy. Once this happened 
he/she was allowed to play with the toy for about 5 seconds before the experimenter took it 
away and placed it under the table and out of view of the subject. Once the experimenter 
finished stowing-away the toy a 10-second coding window began. During this coding 
window the experimenter looked down to avoid any interference and the infant was 
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allowed to reach into the box. After the 10 seconds elapsed, the experimenter removed the 
box and the trial ended. 
The 2-Objects trials had the same structure as 1-Object (Box Empty) trials but it 
contained two separate coding periods: one 10-second coding period after both objects had 
entered the box but only one had been removed by the infant (a “1 Remains” trial), and a 
second after both objects had been retrieved (a “Box Empty” trial). In this trial the 
experimenter again placed the box on the table out of the infant’s reach and brought out a 
toy from the box that he moved in the same fashion as in the 1-Object trial. After putting 
the toy into the box, the experimenter brought out a second toy and repeated the same 
procedure. As the experimenter inserted this second object back into the box, he 
surreptitiously held it at the back entrance of the box so that it was hidden from the infants’ 
grasp. Infants were then allowed to recover the one available object from the box. After 
allowing the infant a few seconds to play with the toy they retrieved, the experimenter took 
the toy from the infant and started the first 10-second coding period (“1 Remains”) by 
looking down toward the ground in order to not bias the subject’s responses. After 10 
seconds, the experimenter retrieved the second toy that was hidden at the back of the box 
and handed it to the infant. After allowing the infant a couple of seconds to play with the 
toy, the experimenter took the toy away and started the second 10-second coding period 
(‘Box Empty’). At the end of this coding period the experimenter retrieved the box and 
began the next trial.  
Data scoring. The dependent measure was the duration of each reach that occurred 
within each 10-second coding window. A reach was defined as any movement that results 
in the third knuckles of the infant’s hand disappearing in the box. The duration was coded 
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by two independent observers who were blind to the conditions. The inter-observer 
agreement was high (r = .94). 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses found no effects of Sex or Block Order. We did find a 
significant effect of Test Order (F(1, 8) = 8.6, p = .02), due to longer searching for infants 
who had trials ordered 1,2,2,1 versus 2,1,1,2. However, there was no interaction between 
this variable and any within-subjects variables; therefore, all three between-subjects effects 
were collapsed in subsequent analyses. 
A 2 (Condition: Same Inside vs. Different Inside) X 3 (Trial Type: 1-Object Box 
Empty, 2-Objects 1 Remain, 2-Objects Box Empty) analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
revealed a significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 30) = 5.63, p = .031, η2p = .27, which 
resulted from longer search times in the Different Inside condition (M = 2.7, SD = 1.87) 
than in the Same Inside condition (M = 1.75, SD = 1.3). The main effect of Trial Type was 
also significant, F(2, 30) = 8.05, p = .002, η2p = .35, due to infants searching longer on 1 
Remain trials than on Box Empty trials (see Graph 1). Finally, there was a Condition X 
Trial Type interaction, F(2, 30) = 4.64, p = .017, η2p = .23, that was followed-up with 
planned comparisons t-tests. The comparison between 1 Object Box Empty and 2 Objects 
Box Empty revealed no significant differences in both the Same Inside condition, t(15) = 
1.33, p = .2, d = .33, two-tailed, and the Different Inside condition, t(15) = 1.26, p = .23, d 
= .36, two-tailed; therefore, these two trial types were collapsed in each condition in a 
single measure of Average Box Empty. In the Different Inside condition infants searched 
significantly longer on 1 Remain trials (M = 4.03 s., SD = 2.69) than on Average Box 
Empty trials (M = 2.05 s., SD = 1.6), t(15) = 4.62, p = .0003, d = .89, two-tailed. However, 
the comparison between 1 Remain trials and the Average Box Empty trials in the Same 
11 
 
Inside condition revealed a non significant difference, t(15) = 1.57, p = .14, d = .39, two-
tailed (M = 2.16 s., SD = 1.77, for 1 Remain, and M = 1.54 s., SD = 1.34, for Average 
Empty). 
The infants’ performance in each Trial Type across Conditions was also compared. 
There was a significant difference in search times on 1 Remain trials across conditions, 
t(15) = -3.48, p =.003, d = .82, two-tailed, due to infants searching longer on Different 
Inside trials than in Same Inside trials. The difference in search times of Average Box 
Empty across conditions was not significant, t(15) = -1.24, p = .23, d =.34, two-tailed. 
A non-parametric Wilcoxon test confirmed the pattern of results obtained with the 
planned t-test. The differences between 1 Object Box Empty and 2 Objects Box Empty 
trials in both conditions were not significant, Z = -.59, p = .55, for Same Inside, and Z = -
1.09, p = .27, for Different Inside. While the comparison between 1 Remains and Average 
Box Empty trials was significant for the Different Inside condition, Z = -3.52, p = .0002, it 
was not significantly different from chance for the Same Inside condition, Z = -1.5, p = .13. 
Finally, the number of infants who searched longer in the 1 Remains trial than in the 
Average Box Empty trials was significant in the Different Inside condition, (n = 16 out of 
16; p = .00003, via a binomial test), but not significant in the Same Inside condition (n = 10 
out of 16; p = .45, via a binomial test). 
The results from Experiment 1 provide evidence that infants spontaneously use 
internal properties differences between agents to represent numerically distinct individuals 
over time. In support of our first hypothesis, when infants observe two agents with different 
insides but identical outsides, they have a strong impression of two different individuals 
participating in the event. By contrast, and in support of the second hypothesis, when 
infants observe two agents with identical insides but different outsides their impression of 
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two different individuals is statistically the same as the impression of one individual. This 
pattern of results indicates that infants represent insides as more diagnostic of an agent’s 
identity than its external properties. Of course, infants might also encode the difference 
between the external appearances of the two agents but this difference may not be 
represented in a way that is powerful enough to represent the agents as separate individuals.  
One possible explanation for why infants would privilege an agent’s internal 
properties for the purpose of individuation is based on an implicit understanding that an 
agent’s ‘insides’ are more causally central to an agent’s identity than its outside features. 
On this view, infants may show less regard for external property differences when there are 
clear indicators of internal properties—properties that carry more biological significance—
that remain the same. Alternatively, the differences in infants’ performance between Same 
Inside and Different Inside conditions could also be the result of lower level strategies. In 
particular, infants might use internal properties to individuate agents because they are in a 
central position and they possess a 3D structure, while the external properties are on the 
periphery and (in our study) only exhibit a 2D appearance. If this were the case, then we 
should observe that infants will use internal properties to keep track of an object’s identity 
independent of that object’s ontological status (i.e., a living thing vs. an inanimate object). 
In order to test these alternative explanations a Experiment 2 replicated the same basic 






Graph 1. Searching duration of Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error of the 



















Participants. Sixteen 13-month-old infants participated in this experiment (mean 
age = 13 months and 11 days, SD = 8 days). Half of the infants were girls. All infants were 
recruited from the Amherst, Massachusetts area. An additional 8 infants were tested but 
were excluded because of fussiness (1), or disinterest (7). 
Stimuli, design, procedure. The stimuli, design, and procedure for the second 
experiment were the same for that of Experiment 1, except that both animacy cues (i.e., 
eyes and self-propelled movement) were eliminated. The toy’s eyes were replaced by two 
white circles in order to maintain the same balance between the visible covered area of the 
cube inside and the outside. However, these white circles were attached in a vertical 
configuration to avoid any resemblance to a face (see Figure 3). To eliminate the self-
propelled motion cue each toy was visibly moved by the experimenter’s hand, following an 
identical motion path that the toys traveled in Experiment 1. The reaching duration was 
coded by two independent observers. The inter-observer agreement was high (r = 0.95). 
 
Figure 3. Example toy for Experiment 2. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analysis found no effects of Sex, Block Order, or Trial Type. 
Subsequent analyses collapsed over these variables. A 2 (Condition: Same Inside vs. 
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Different Inside) X 3 (Trial Type: 1-Object Box Empty, 2-Objects 1 Remain, 2-Objects 
Box Empty) ANOVA yielded no significant main effect for Condition, F(1, 30) = .61, p = 
.45, η2p = .039, and Trial Type, F(2, 30) = 1.24, p = .3, η2p = .07. This analysis also 
revealed a no significant interaction, F(2, 30) = 0.4, p = .67, η2p = .026.  
In spite of the lack of an interaction planned comparisons t-test across Trial Types 
in each Condition were carried out. The comparison between 1-Object Box Empty and 2-
Objects Box Empty revealed no significant differences in both the Same Inside condition, 
t(15) = -.73, p = .48, d = -0.25, two-tailed, and the Different Inside condition, t(15) = -.45, p 
= .66, d = -0.14, two-tailed; therefore, these two trial types were collapsed in each 
condition. The comparison between 1 Remains trial and the Average Box Empty trials 
revealed a significant difference in the Same Inside Condition, t(15) = 2.35, p = .03, d = 
.51, two-tailed, which resulted from longer search times on 1 Remains trials (M = 2.45 s., 
SD = 1.44) than on Average Box Empty (M = 1.81, SD = 1.06). However, in the Different 
Inside condition searching duration for 1 Remains (M = 1.85 s., SD = 1.07) and Average 
Box Empty (M = 1.69 s., SD = 1.46) did not differ significantly, t(15) = .48, p = .64, d = 
.12, two-tailed. The comparison of search time in each Trial Type across Conditions did not 
reveal significant differences on either Average Box Empty trials, t(15) = .028, p = .78, d = 
.09, two-tailed, or on 1 Remains trials t(15) = 1.52, p = .15, d = .54, two-tailed. 
A non-parametric Wilcoxon test confirmed the pattern of results obtained with the 
planned t-test. The differences between 1-Object Box Empty and 2-Objects Box Empty in 
both conditions were not significant, Z = -.66, p = .51, for Same Inside, and Z = -.9, p = .36, 
for Different Inside trials. While the comparison between 1 Remains and Average Box 
Empty trials was significant within the Same Inside block, Z = -2.27, p = .02, it was not 
significant within the Different Inside block, Z = -1.02, p = .3. Finally, the number of 
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infants who searched longer in the 1 Remain trial than in Average Box Empty was 
significantly different from chance within the Same Inside block, (n = 13 out of 16; p = .02, 
via a binomial test), but it was not significantly different from chance within the Different 
Inside block (n = 10 out of 16; p = .45, via a binomial test). 
The results of Experiment 2 show that infants had a stronger impression of two 
objects during Same Insides trials than in Different Insides trials, the opposite pattern as in 
Experiment 1. These results indicate that when observing inanimate objects, infants 
represent external properties differences as more closely related to a change in identity than 
internal property differences. Presumably, the transparent spheres were interpreted as 
containers, in which case the outsides are better indicators of a change in identity than the 
insides. For instance, a cup remains the same object regardless whether it is filled either 
with water or soda. When compared to Experiment 1, these data support the hypothesis that 
internal features are especially important for representing the identity of animate and 
agentive objects. This experiment also rules out the low-level alternative explanations for 
the infants’ performance in Experiment 1; neither the central position nor the 3D structure 







Graph 2. Searching duration for Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error of the 


















The current experiments used an individuation task to investigate a possible internal 
feature bias in infants’ representations of agent identity. Experiment 1 found that infants 
individuate transparent objects with self-propelled motion and agentive features (i.e., eyes) 
using the color of their internal properties, while they tend to disregard the color of their 
external properties. By contrast, in Experiment 2 we found that infants tend to use external 
properties to individuate the same transparent objects when they lack both self-propelled 
motion and agentive features. These findings suggest that infants represent internal 
properties as more closely connected to agents’ identity than external properties. Instead of 
employing a domain-general criterion of similarity to represent  an agent’s persisting 
identity over time, the current data suggests that infants use domain-specific biological 
knowledge, where the insides are especially relevant for the agent’s identity but not for the 
identity of inanimate objects. 
Two different alternative explanations were ruled out in the second experiment. A 
non-significant difference between the Same Insides and Different Insides conditions when 
infants observe inanimate transparent objects indicates that insides are not especially 
important due to either their central position in the sphere or based on their 3D structure. In 
fact, the pattern of results suggests that the objects might be interpreted by infants as salient 
containers that possess other objects inside. By contrast, in Experiment 1 the insides might 
have been interpreted as the internal structure of one animate entity, in which case the 
insides and the outsides jointly would make up something like the agent’s “body”. 
Another alternative explanation for the observed pattern of results could be that, 
from a frontal view, the toy’s eyes draw attention towards the internal features. Since eyes 
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tend to be a very salient feature for infants, they might have encoded the color of the insides 
more robustly based on their proximity to the eyes. This interpretation, however, is unlikely 
for at least two different reasons. First, along its travel on the top of the box the toy is also 
seen from a side view where the eyes are not wholly perceived and the external features are 
more salient than the internal ones. Second, previous categorization studies using eyes on 
the toy’s surface (Welder & Graham, 2006; Newman et al., 2008) show that infants are still 
biased to categorize objects based on the internal features even when the eyes do not 
overlap with the ‘insides’. Therefore, it seems to be unlikely that the infants’ attention to 
the internal features is due to any of the aforementioned low-level explanations.  
Why might infants represent internal features as more diagnostic of an agent’s 
identity than its external features? One possible explanation has to do with the causal role 
that infants may attribute to the insides when observing the objects moving on the top of 
the box. For instance, as indicated by Setoh et al. (2013), infants only infer the presence of 
something inside an object when it displays self-propelled motion and agentive features, 
which suggests that infants represent ‘insides’ as a biological and causal factor in order to 
explain both motion and agency (the “Innards Principle”). Furthermore, several studies 
with adults and preschool aged children have revealed that causal properties are more 
central in the conceptual representation than so-called ‘effect factors’ (Anh, 1998; Ahn, 
Gelman, Amsterlaw, Hohenstein & Kalish, 2000). For instance, several categorization 
studies have shown that causal factors (e.g. goat DNA) are more reliable indicators of 
category membership than effect factors (e.g. give milk; Rehder, 2003; Sloman, 2005). 
Therefore, in the infant’s early representation of agents, the ‘insides’ may play a role of a 
causal placeholder, which might be more informative than the external properties for 
categorizing and identifying agents. In particular, in the current study keeping track of 
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internal features as a causal factor could be more diagnostic of a change in identity over 
time than keeping track of external features. 
If the previous interpretation is correct, why do infants represent the insides as 
something causally relevant and connected to the agents’ identity and what are the 
consequences of this interpretation across development? Setoh et al. (2013) propose that the 
inference of insides arises from an ancient cognitive mechanism devoted to detect possible 
prey, in such a way that the insides of prey are conceptualized as valuable sources of 
nutrients. Although feasible, this interpretation does not provide an explanation about why 
the insides seem to be especially informative for representing an agents’ identity. A second 
possibility could be that the inference of internal causally-relevant properties arises from an 
early tendency to categorize objects into kinds, which would be consistent with an 
essentialist bias in infancy (Cacchione, Schaub & Rakoczy, 2013; Futo, Teglas, Csibra & 
Gergely, 2010; Gergely & Jacob, 2012; Xu, 2005). Several studies have revealed that early 
on in development children represent the possession of a non-obvious property as 
determinant of an object’s categorical identity. For example, infants expect objects 
categorized with the same label to share a non-obvious property regardless their physical 
similarity (Dewar & Xu, 2009; Graham & Kilbreath, 2007), and conversely, preschool aged 
children expect dissimilar objects with identical non-obvious causal powers to share the 
same label (Gopnick & Nazzi, 2003). However, in infancy the knowledge of insides as 
causally relevant non-obvious properties seems to be specific to biological kinds, insofar as 
the causal role of insides in artifacts emerges later on (Sobel, Yoachim, Gopnik, Meltzoff & 
Blumenthal 2007; Sobel & Munro, 2009). Consequently, the association between an 
agent’s insides and their identity that emerged in the current study may be the result of an 
early understanding of insides as a biological kind-relevant property that possesses more 
21 
 
information than the outsides about the categorical identity of a particular agent. This 
understanding, in turn, may be further elaborated across development giving rise to more 
specific expectations in such a way that different biological kinds are attributed different 
insides with particular causal powers (Keil, 1989). Future research should investigate 
whether this is the case, and what type of factors, linguistic and non-linguistic, may be 

























Graph 1. Histogram Same Inside One Remain  
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